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Pandemic Hope for Chapter 11 Financing 
David Skeel 
 
abstract.  The pandemic revealed that the increasing complexity of debtor’s capital struc-
ture could supply much-needed competition in the Chapter 11 financing market, as other inside 
lenders increasingly challenge a debtor’s favored inside lenders. A�er discussing the benefits of 
this surprising development, the Essay identifies several impediments and offers strategies for 
removing them. 
 
A�er Neiman Marcus, the luxury department store, filed for Chapter 11 in 
May 2020, two different groups of lenders vied to provide bankruptcy financ-
ing. Neiman’s managers had arranged a $675 million lending package with a 
group of its first lien lenders prior to bankruptcy and requested approval for 
that group to provide the financing at the outset of the case.1 Another investor 
group, which included Mudrick Capital Management and Third Point, quickly 
countered with a $700 million loan proposal.2 The competing investors offered 
a lower interest rate and a different strategy for resolving Neiman’s financial 
distress.3 
 
1. See, e.g., Mike Spector & Jessica DiNapoli, Exclusive: Neiman Marcus Creditor Calls for Deal 
with Saks Fi�h Avenue - Letter, REUTERS (May 12, 2020, 8:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-neinmanmarcus-m-a-saksfi�havenue-exc-idUSKBN22P035 [https://perma.cc
/Y5B8-Q5KD]. 
2. See Objection to Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Au-
thorizing the Debtors to (A) Obtain Postpetition Financing and (B) Utilize Cash Collateral, 
(II) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties, (III) Modifying the Au-
tomatic Stay, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (V) Granting Related Relief at 1, In re 
Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 7, 2020) [hereina�er Mudrick 
Objection], [https://perma.cc/XF6L-2UGF] (describing the counterproposal and objection 
by Mudrick Capital). 
3. The Mudrick/Third Point proposal called for Neiman to solicit buyers and shi� to a tradi-
tional Chapter 11 restructuring only if Neiman did not receive a credible offer during a nine-
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Neiman’s choice of lenders for its operations in bankruptcy was quite re-
markable in two respects. First, Neiman had ready access to financing, as re-
flected in its receiving two different financing offers. The economy was shut 
down due to COVID-19, and there had been ominous signs in the financing 
market. Only a few weeks earlier, Sanchez Energy, a company already in bank-
ruptcy at the outset of the pandemic, announced that it was unable to repay its 
bankruptcy loan.4 Some commentators were warning that a crisis in the lend-
ing market might be imminent.5 But Neiman had little trouble obtaining a 
sizeable new loan. Its financial advisor “acknowledged that the proposed [fi-
nancing] is ‘certainly unusual’ in the sense that the debtors are obtaining fi-
nancing despite the company largely not operating at the moment given the 
store closures amid the Covid-19 pandemic.”6 
Why was so much financing available to Neiman? In part because equity 
funds and other potential investors had an estimated $2.5 trillion of available 
funding (i.e., “dry power”) at the outset of the crisis, due to a perceived dearth 
of attractive investment opportunities.7 The unexpected buoyancy of the stock 
market also contributed. The large amount of federal money available under 
the CARES Act and other stimulus funding may have played a role, too, alt-
hough that money could not be used for bankruptcy loans.8 
 
ty-day auction period. See, e.g., Neiman Marcus Group LLC $700 Million Superpriority 
Senior Secured Debtor in Possession Credit Facility Term Sheet exhibit A to annex I, in 
Mudrick Objection, supra note 3, at 37.(Neiman Marcus Group LLC $700 Million Super-
priority Senior Secured Debtor in Possession Credit Facility Term Sheet) (milestone calling 
for final auction bids within 90 days). 
4. See Andrew Scurria & Aisha Al-Muslim, Bankruptcy Loans Turn Dangerous, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
8, 2020, 8:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptcy-loans-turn-dangerous-11586
347202 [https://perma.cc/Z67D-J72E]. 
5. Id. 
6. See Neiman Marcus Receives All Requested First Day Relief, Including Interim DIP Financing 




7. For discussion of this factor and those that follow, see Part I, infra. 
8. The $500 billion lending program in the CARES Act that was designed for large businesses 
was linked to the Federal Reserve’s emergency-lending power under section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act, which precludes loans to borrowers that are in bankruptcy. See, e.g., 
David Skeel, Bankruptcy and the Coronavirus: Part II, BROOKINGS INST. 7 (July 2020), https:
//www.brookings.edu/research/bankruptcy-and-the-coronavirus-part-ii [https://perma.cc
/G72B-HNWZ] (describing the limitation on borrowers in bankruptcy). The Paycheck Pro-
tection Program, which initially authorized up to $660 billion in loans to smaller businesses, 
did not explicitly prohibit loans in bankruptcy, but it was administered by the Small Busi-
ness Administration, which does. Id. 
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The other remarkable feature of Neiman’s access to financing was that two 
different bidders offered to provide the “debtor-in-possession” financing.9 In 
most cases, a debtor has a single source of funding, usually from its principal 
prebankruptcy lenders.10 The willingness of multiple lenders to provide DIP 
financing for Neiman may have stemmed in part from the confluence of the 
developments just described: large amounts of investable funds, a buoyant 
stock market, and the federal stimulus money. 
But another, underappreciated factor also came into play: a striking shi� in 
the capital structure of many corporate debtors. Capital structure is increasing-
ly disaggregated.11 Companies o�en borrow not just from one group of lend-
ers—as with a syndicated loan in which a variety of lenders have stakes—but 
from multiple groups of diverse lenders, o�en under arrangements that give 
one group a first lien on the debtor’s assets and the other a second lien.12 Radi-
oShack, in an early illustration of this trend, had two major groups of secured 
lenders, with an agreement between the two groups and separate agreements 
within each group.13 
In this Essay, I argue that this trend could help solve a serious, longstand-
ing problem in the market for DIP financing. In the past, the senior lenders of 
most corporate debtors were banks or a single syndicate of banks and other 
lenders.14 Because of the information asymmetry between the debtor’s princi-
 
9. The term, which is quite nonintuitive to those who are not bankruptcy experts, comes from 
the fact that bankruptcy law deems the debtor and its managers to be a “debtor in posses-
sion”—that is, a debtor that has authority over its assets—when the debtor files for bank-
ruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2018) (providing the powers of a debtor in possession). If the 
debtor obtains financing for its operations in bankruptcy, the funds are thus debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing. 
10. See B. Espen Eckbo, Kai Li & Wei Wang, Rent Extraction by Super-Priority Lenders 4 (Tuck 
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3384389, 2020) (citing evidence that 80% of bankruptcy fi-
nancing comes from the debtor’s current lenders); Frederick Tung, Financing Failure: Bank-
ruptcy Lending, Credit Market Conditions, and the Financial Crisis, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 651, 
655 n.13 (2020) (noting that in a sample data set of debtor-in-possession loans, 75% of 
bankruptcy financing came from debtors’ current lenders). 
11. See generally Kenneth Ayotte, Why Do Bankrupt Firms Have Such Complex Capital Structures, 
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 20, 2018), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/12/20/why-
do-bankrupt-firms-have-such-complex-capital-structures [https://perma.cc/6EMR-QF2F] 
(noting and speculating about possible reasons for the recent increase in capital-structure 
complexity). 
12. For further discussion of first- and second-lien arrangements, see Section III.A, infra. 
13. See Salus Cap. Partners, LLC v. Standard Wireless Inc. (In re RadioShack Corp.), 550 B.R. 
700, 703 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). 
14. See, e.g., Douglas R. Gooding & Jonathan D. Marshall, Bankruptcy Is Uncharted Territory for 
Unitranche Lenders, J. CORP. RENEWAL (Sept. 2018), https://turnaround.org/jcr/2018/09
/bankruptcy-uncharted-territory-unitranche-lenders [https://perma.cc/M9AU-2G3M] 
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pal lenders (who have more and better information about the debtor) and out-
side lenders (who have less and worse information), outside lenders are dis-
couraged from competing to finance corporate debtors. The effects of the in-
formation asymmetry are magnified by a “debt overhang” problem: because 
some of the benefits of any new financing will accrue to the existing lenders, 
new lenders are unlikely to offer financing unless they are given priority over 
the existing lenders.15 The vast majority—75% or 80%—of DIP loans come 
from the debtor’s existing lenders, and these lenders consistently earn su-
pracompetitive profits, which suggests that the obstacles to alternative financ-
ing are severe.16 
Due to the fragmentation of firms’ capital structures, many corporate debt-
ors now have at least two groups of lenders, and sometimes more. Neiman 
Marcus, for example, had five different substantial groups of secured lenders.17 
Although the new capital structure complexity has potential downsides,18 it al-
so has a significant upside: it can provide a solution, or at least the beginning 
of a solution, to the lack of competition for DIP financing. Rather than outside 
lenders, a different source of alternative financing—other inside lenders, who 
do not face the same information asymmetries as outsiders—may challenge the 
favored insider lenders. Neiman’s ready access to financing and choice between 
multiple potential lenders could become a much more common experience 
among corporations filing for Chapter 11. Even the possibility that an alterna-
tive bid may emerge could force a debtor’s lenders to offer a more competitive 
rate for bankruptcy financing. 
As the discussion above reflects, the descriptive and normative claims in 
this Essay draw on a rich literature about bankruptcy financing.19 This Essay is 
the first to point out that the solution—or at the least, a partial solution—to 
 
(“When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the assets of a typical debtor were encumbered 
by a lien held by a single secured creditor.”). 
15. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 149-55 (1977). 
16. Eckbo et al., supra note 10, at 4 (80% of loans from insiders); id. at 28 (supracompetitive 
profits); Tung, supra note 10, at 655 n.13 (75% of loans from insiders). 
17. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that Neiman had five substantial groups of 
lenders and an additional $100 million loan). 
18. Focusing on debt overhang rather than information asymmetries, Professors Ayotte and El-
lias show that a first- and second-lien structure can discourage lower-priority creditors from 
competing with a DIP-financing offer from the first liens if the second-lien lenders are not 
permitted to receive a priming lien. Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for 
Sale, 39 YALE J. ON REGUL. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 23-32, 57-59), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=3611350 [https://perma.cc/2FPL-86M8]. 
19. See Tung, supra note 10; Eckbo et al., supra note 10; Ayotte & Ellias, supra note 18. A key ear-
lier contribution in a similar vein is Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor 
Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 514 (2009). 
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these concerns may lie in plain sight: in the fragmentation of debtors’ capital 
structures. 
Unfortunately, three features of current bankruptcy practice may prevent 
this optimistic scenario from emerging. First, courts have been reluctant to 
grant nonconsensual “priming” liens—that is, liens that take priority even over 
the liens of existing lenders—which are needed to solve debt overhang prob-
lems.20 Second, the intercreditor agreements that first and second lienholders 
enter into sometimes prohibit second lienholders from providing bankruptcy 
financing absent consent by the first liens, thus stymieing a potential alterna-
tive source of funding.21 Finally, the debtor and key creditors o�en enter into a 
restructuring support agreement (RSA),22 which may preclude any of the sig-
natories from offering alternative financing. As a result, the RSA may preempt 
competition to provide financing. 
It is important not to overstate the impediments. Even if courts continue on 
their current track, the number of competing DIP financing offers seems likely 
to increase. Although courts have been reluctant to award nonconsensual prim-
ing liens, the lucrative fees in this market are likely to entice other lenders in 
the capital stack of debtors with fragmented capital structures to challenge fa-
vored bids, putting pressure on courts to take these bids more seriously. By 
more carefully scrutinizing contractual provisions that interfere with competi-
tive offers, or by amending bankruptcy law to encourage more competition, 
courts and lawmakers could spur even more competition. 
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the surprising abun-
dance of funding during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Part II, the focus turns to 
the striking shi� in the capital structure of many corporations that later file for 
bankruptcy, and the potential for this shi� to increase the competitiveness of 
the bankruptcy-financing market. Finally, Part III analyzes potential impedi-
ments to a more competitive market for bankruptcy financing and proposes 
potential correctives for each. Much of Part III is devoted to judicial scrutiny of 
the obstacles to a competitive lending market, but it also considers the possibil-
ity of amending bankruptcy law to address courts’ reluctance to grant priming 
liens and loan provisions that stymie potential competing loans. 
 
20. Priming liens, which are authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1) (2018), are discussed in Part II, 
infra. 
21. This is discussed in detail in Section III.A, infra. 
22. A restructuring support agreement (RSA) binds its signatories to the terms of a reorganiza-
tion plan consistent with the terms they have negotiated. RSAs and their implications for fi-
nancing are the focus of Section III.B, infra. 
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i .  an abundance of bankruptcy financing 
When the COVID-19 crisis worsened in early 2020, causing the American 
economy to shut down, it seemed to augur a surge in Chapter 11 filings and a 
potential liquidity crisis as corporate debtors struggled to obtain bankruptcy 
financing.23 During the Great Recession of 2008-2009, this is more or less 
what happened. In fall 2008, at the height of the crisis, access to bankruptcy fi-
nancing evaporated for a few months, and corporate bankruptcies more than 
doubled.24 
The COVID-19 pandemic had the potential to be even worse than the Great 
Recession, given the breadth of the economic shutdown. At first, the shutdown 
seemed to destabilize the DIP financing market. Sanchez Energy, which had 
filed for bankruptcy before the crisis, announced it would be unable to pay its 
bankruptcy loan.25 The prospect of a default, an uncommon occurrence with 
DIP financing,26 and uncertainty as to how long the economic shutdown 
would last pointed to the possibility of major turmoil in the financing market. 
Yet turmoil never materialized. Since the pandemic began, large corporate 
debtors have had ready access to financing. The most remarkable example was 
Hertz, which considered financing its bankruptcy by selling stock a�er a surge 
of speculative trading significantly increased the stock price.27 Were it not for 
the disapproval of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Hertz might not 
have needed a loan at all.28 In the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, two different 
 
23. I was among those who warned of a potential wave. See David Skeel, Bankruptcy and the 
Coronavirus, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research
/bankruptcy-and-the-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/3FLX-9DLJ]. A large group of bank-
ruptcy scholars sprang into action early in the pandemic, forming working groups to pro-
pose responses to a bankruptcy wave. See, e.g., Letter from Jared A. Ellias, Chair, Large 
Corp. Comm. of Bankr. & COVID-19 Working Grp., to Mitch McConnell, U.S. Sen., Chuck 
Schumer, U.S. Sen., Nancy Pelosi, U.S. Rep. & Kevin McCarthy, U.S. Rep. (June 10, 2020) 
(on file with author) (advocating for measures to expand the capacity of the bankruptcy sys-
tem). 
24. Business bankruptcy filings jumped from 28,322 in 2007 to 60,837 in 2009. The statistics are 
available at Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year, 1980-2020, AM. BANKR. INST., 
https://abi-org.s3.amazonaws.com/Newsroom/Bankruptcy_Statistics/Total-Business-
Consumer1980-Present.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7TK-U3ME]. 
25. See Scurria & Al-Muslim, supra note 4. 
26. Id. 
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groups of lenders competed to provide financing.29 Overall, debtors obtained 
roughly $20.762 billion of DIP financing in 2020 amid the pandemic—over $5 
billion more than debtors obtained in 2019.30 
Why so much financing? One explanation is the estimated $2.5 trillion of 
“dry power” that distressed debt funds had at the outset of the pandemic.31 
With attractive investment opportunities scarce, funds had accumulated capi-
tal. Potential lenders were unusually well-positioned to make bankruptcy loans 
due to this quirk of the lending environment. 
In addition to this private investment, the federal government pumped an 
enormous amount of federal money into the economy during the pandemic, 
both through legislative interventions such as the $2.1 trillion CARES Act, 
which directed funding to joint efforts of the Federal Reserve and Treasury, and 
through independent Federal Reserve programs.32 Because these programs 
generally could not be used for bankruptcy loans,33 federal money did not di-
rectly enhance access to DIP financing. Still, it appears to have increased liquid-
ity for corporate debtors in indirect ways. For instance, the abundance of feder-
al funds may have diminished funding opportunities for private lenders outside 
of bankruptcy, encouraging them to provide bankruptcy loans. 
Like federal funding, the strength of the stock market throughout the pan-
demic may have also indirectly affected access to DIP financing. Many troubled 
corporate debtors appear to have been able to avoid bankruptcy altogether 
without borrowing money due to the ease of raising capital by selling stock.34 
AMC Theatres is a vivid illustration. Though it was an obvious candidate for 
Chapter 11 early in the pandemic, it proceeded to raise $1.2 billion through eq-
 
29. See Parts II and III, infra, for a detailed discussion of the Neiman Marcus bids. 
30. My thanks to David Smith for these numbers, which he compiled from information in the 
Deal database. See Email from David C. Smith, Professor of Com., Univ. of Virginia, to Da-
vid Skeel, Professor of Corp. L., Univ. of Pennsylvania (June 7, 2021, 2:37 PM) (on file with 
author). 
31. The $2.5 trillion number comes from Edith Hotchkiss, Greg Nini & David C. Smith, Corpo-
rate Capital Raising During the COVID Crisis 9 (Nov. 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). Eliot Ganz and David Smith had noted early in the pandemic that 
there was an unusual amount of funding available for companies experiencing bankruptcy. 
Elliot Ganz & David Smith, It’s Not Time for a Government Bankruptcy Facility, REALCLEAR 
MTS. (June 15, 2020), https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2020/06/15/its_not_time
_for_a_government_bankruptcy_facility_496152.html [https://perma.cc/22LW-ZV2G]. 
32. For a discussion of federal-economic stimulus provided through the CARES Act and the 
Paycheck Protection Program, see note 8, supra. 
33. Id. 
34. See, e.g., Emily Flitter, Matt Phillips & Peter Eavis, How the Stock Market’s Relentless Rise 
Saved Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/business
/stock-market-banks.html [https://perma.cc/7W4M-MNUC]. 
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uity issuances in a single quarter.35 In addition to indirectly boosting the DIP 
financing market by diminishing lending opportunities outside of bankruptcy, 
stock-market strength directly contributed to the robust market for the new 
stock of corporate debtors when they exited bankruptcy.36 
Finally, another less obvious factor enhanced access to DIP financing: the 
increased complexity of corporate debtors’ capital structure due to first- and 
second-lien arrangements and other new financing structures, as discussed ear-
lier and in more detail in the next Part. Compared to the $2.5 trillion in availa-
ble funding and the massive amounts of federal aid, this capital-structure shi� 
is less dramatic and was perhaps less important during the pandemic.37 But as I 
argue in Part II below, the new capital structure has major implications for the 
future of Chapter 11. 
ii .  the new capital structure:  multiple inside lenders 
When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, the bankruptcy-financing 
provision was one of its key innovations.38 The provision sharply expanded 
debtors’ ability to obtain financing by empowering bankruptcy judges to pro-
vide sweeping protections for lenders who agree to finance debtors’ operations 
in bankruptcy—including a “priming lien” that has priority even over existing 
secured creditors.39 
If DIP financing functioned like the competitive markets taught in Eco-
nomics 101, early entrants into the market would have made supracompetitive 
 
35. Matt Phillips, AMC Cashes in on Meme Stock Mania, Raising $587 Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 
3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/03/business/amc-meme-stock.html [https://
perma.cc/U9A9-WEZ7]. 
36. See, e.g., Ciara Linnane, Bankrupt Hertz’ Stock Soars 62% on News of Deal to Exit Chapter 11 
that Will Benefit Shareholders, MARKETWATCH (May 13, 2021, 2:48 PM ET), https://www
.marketwatch.com/story/bankrupt-hertz-shares-soar-62-on-news-of-deal-to-exit-chapter-
11-that-will-benefit-shareholders-11620845287 [https://perma.cc/2DTS-8UDT] (describing 
plans for the sale of newly issued Hertz stock in connection with its reorganization). 
37. See discussion supra note 30 and infra Part II. 
38. For a historical overview, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-
Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905 (2004). 
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2018). If unsecured financing is not available, the lender can be given an 
administrative priority, which is a claim that generally must be paid in full in cash at the end 
of the case. See id. § 1129(a)(9). Alternatively, or in addition to administrative priority, the 
lender can be given a lien on some or all of the debtor’s assets. The final and most dramatic 
option is a “priming” lien with priority even over existing liens if existing lienholder’s inter-
ests are “adequately protected.” As discussed at the end of this Part and the beginning of Part 
III, the bankruptcy court’s priming-lien authority will be essential to fostering a more com-
petitive DIP financing market. 
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profits, which would have declined as the market matured. But this did not 
prove to be the case. Recent evidence suggests that DIP lenders continue to 
make extraordinary profits. One study, for example, found that lenders charge 
several percentage points higher than a competitive interest rate.40 Another 
concluded that DIP loans are priced similarly to junk debt, despite being far 
less risky.41 
The key to understanding the stickiness of DIP lenders’ supracompetitive 
profits lies in another feature of the market: 75% or more of DIP loans are 
made by the debtor’s current lender.42 The dominance of insider lenders stems 
from two factors that discourage competition. The first is information asym-
metries. Because a debtor’s existing lender has better information about the 
debtor, it is difficult for a new lender to compete.43 Second, the inside lender 
o�en has a lien on all the debtor’s assets; one study found that 75% of bank-
ruptcy debtors obtain senior secured financing before bankruptcy and the loans 
are secured by all of the debtor’s assets 97% of the time.44 Unless the court 
grants a priming lien, a new lender’s loan may subsidize the existing lender at 
the expense of the new lender, since the existing lender has the first claim on 
any value created. This effect—debt overhang—may further discourage new 
entrants.45 
If the debtor has a single lender or syndicate of lenders, the obstacles to ob-
taining financing from any lender other than the current lender may be insur-
mountable. If the debtor’s existing lender has offered to provide new financing, 
a new entrant will be competing with a lender that has better information and 
an existing relationship with the debtor, and it may suspect that the debtor will 
be reluctant to take a chance on a new lender. Even if the existing lender de-
clines to supply additional funding, a new entrant may still be reluctant to offer 
financing, given the adverse signal sent by the current lender’s refusal to make 
another loan. 
With current corporate debtors, however, the traditional pattern of a single 
lender or syndicate of lenders o�en does not apply. A debtor’s financing is 
much more likely to be fragmented.46 A key development has been the in-
 
40. Eckbo et al., supra note 10, at 28-29 (supracompetitive profits). 
41. Tung, supra note 10, at 686 (comparable to junk bonds). 
42. Eckbo et al., supra note 10, at 41 (80%); Tung, supra note 10, at 655 n.13 (75%). 
43. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1579-85 (2013) (discussing information asymmetry (or “adverse selec-
tion”) issues). 
44. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 19, at 513-14. 
45. See Myers, supra note 15, at 149-55. 
46. For a similar point, see Gooding & Marshall, supra note 14. 
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creased use of first- and second-lien arrangements in which a group of lenders 
holds a first lien on the debtor’s assets and another group holds a second-
priority lien.47 The first and second lienholders o�en enter into an “intercredi-
tor” agreement that specifies their rights vis-à-vis one another. Less common 
but somewhat similar are “unintranche” arrangements, which have a similar 
priority arrangement but are framed as single loan rather than separate first 
lien and second loans.48 Some corporate debtors have even more groups of sen-
ior lenders. Neiman Marcus had five separate collateralized loans ranging from 
$561.7 million to $2,253.1 million at the time of bankruptcy, including both sec-
ond- and third-lien loans.49 Each group may itself be comprised of a variety of 
lenders, ranging from distressed debt funds to traditional commercial banks. 
This fragmentation of corporate debtors’ borrowing can have problematic 
effects. Intercreditor agreements among the parties,50 or the lien structure it-
self,51 can interfere with an efficient restructuring process. But the fragmenta-
tion also has an important and underappreciated potential upside: it ensures 
that the debtor has multiple inside lenders, rather than just one. This creates 
the possibility of lending competition from within the debtor’s capital struc-
ture. The shi� in debtors’ capital structure suggests that improved competition 
and a more efficient lending market actually may come not by encouraging out-
side lenders to provide DIP financing, as one might assume; it may come from 
other inside lenders instead. 
 
47. An early discussion of second liens marveled at the “exponential increase in the number of 
second lien financings in the senior bank loan market.” Neil Cummings & Kirk A. Daven-
port, A Primer on Second Lien Term Loan Financings, 2004 COM. LENDING REV. 11. 
48. For a discussion of unitranche loans, see Gooding & Marshall, supra note 14; and Andrew 
Hedlund, Rise in Private Credit Leads to Boost in Unitranche Loans, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2020, 
2:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/unitranche-size/rise-in-private-credit-leads-to-
boost-in-unitranche-loans-idUSL1N2AJ15Q [https://perma.cc/VDN9-W8C9] (“Seven uni-
tranches of at least US$1bn have been extended in 2019 and the opening months of 2020, 
according to Refinitiv LPC data.”). 
49. It also had a smaller, $100 million secured loan. See, e.g., Debtors’ Emergency Motion for 
Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing the Debtors to (A) Obtain Postpetition 
Financing and (B) Utilize Cash Collateral, (II) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition 
Secured Parties, (III) Modifying the Automatic Stay, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and 
(V) Granting Related Relief at 22, In re Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. May 7, 2020) [hereina�er Neiman Marcus DIP Financing Motion] (listing Neiman’s 
obligations). 
50. The intercreditor agreements entered into between first-lien and second-lien creditors may 
create externalities, for instance, or have the effect of silencing a key constituency. See Ken-
neth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW. U. L. 
REV. 255, 284-86 (2017). 
51. See Ayotte & Ellias, supra note 18, at 23-32 (describing the possibility that second lienholders 
may not offer financing in the absence of a priming lien). 
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The Nieman Marcus bankruptcy illustrates the potential pattern. When 
Nieman filed for bankruptcy, it had arranged for $600 million of new financing 
from a group of existing lenders, including Pacific Investment Management 
Co., Davidson Kempner Capital Management LP, and TPG’s Sixth Street Part-
ners.52 An investor group that comprised investment firm Mudrick Capital 
Management LP and Third Point LLC countered with an offer to lend $700 
million at a lower interest rate and significantly lower fees than the favored 
lenders’ loan.53 
Mudrick Capital was not a random outside lender that saw Neiman Marcus 
as an attractive lending opportunity. To the contrary, Mudrick Capital already 
had a stake in Neiman Marcus, holding $144 million of its first-lien loans.54 
Mudrick was thus an inside lender. Prior to Neiman’s bankruptcy, Mudrick had 
pressed its managers to pursue a sale or merger with Saks Fi�h Avenue.55 
Mudrick’s proposed loan reflected its vision for Neiman’s future. A key condi-
tion of the competing proposal was that Neiman Marcus would be required to 
first seek a sale of its assets, before attempting to reorganize its finances and 
operations. If no credible bidder emerged, Neiman Marcus could try to achieve 
a traditional reorganization.56 
Neiman and its preferred lenders fended off the Mudrick threat by appeal-
ing to courts’ traditional reluctance to protect a new lender with a priming 
lien.57 Neiman argued that it would not be possible to provide adequate protec-
tion of the preferred lenders’ liens, which the DIP financing provision requires 
as a prerequisite for approving a priming lien. According to Neiman’s principal 
bankruptcy lawyer, a “non-consensual priming fight is not a fight that we could 
win.”58 Neiman’s and its lawyer’s not-so-subtle point was that, because Neiman 
and the favored lenders had no intention of agreeing to a priming lien giving 
 
52. See, e.g., Mike Spector, Svea Herbst-Bayliss & Jessica DiNapoli, Exclusive: Investors to Chal-
lenge Neiman Marcus Bankruptcy Loan, Push for Sale - Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2020, 10:06 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-neimanmarcus-bankruptcy-exclusive-idCAKCN
22905E [https://perma.cc/US8M-56CH]. 
53. Mudrick’s loan would have been at 11% interest, and it vowed to charge one-half the back-
stop fees of the favored lenders’ loan. See Mudrick Objection, supra note 2, at 10-11. 
54. Id. at 1. 
55. See Spector & DiNapoli, supra note 1. 
56. Mudrick Objection, supra note 2, at 10. Under Mudrick’s $700 million proposal, $100 mil-
lion would be set aside to pay some of Neiman’s existing lenders. Id. 
57. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, Ayotte and Morrison found that “80 percent of 
priming liens involve the DIP lender priming itself,” and their data did not reveal what por-
tion of the rest involved consensual priming liens. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 19, at 525. 
58. See REORG, supra note 6 (quoting comments of Chad Husnick of Kirkland & Ellis at the 
First Day Orders hearing). 
the yale law journal forum November 10, 2021 
326 
Mudrick priority over their liens, the Mudrick bid could not be approved un-
less the court conducted a valuation hearing to determine whether Neiman’s 
assets were sufficient to ensure payment of the favored lenders despite their 
subordination to a new priming lien; any effort to demonstrate “adequate pro-
tection” would fail, they claimed. This seems to have been sufficient to dis-
suade the court from seriously considering the Mudrick alternative. Although 
the court described the preferred lenders’ loan as “expensive money” and 
mused that “[w]e all wish that Neiman Marcus could get a [Paycheck Protec-
tion Program] loan and that it would be free,” it rejected Mudrick’s challenge 
and approved the preferred loan.59 
As the Neiman battle reflects, genuine competition in the DIP lending mar-
ket will depend on courts’ willingness to grant nonconsensual priming liens in 
appropriate cases. Given that corporate debtors invariably have few unencum-
bered assets, alternative lenders face debt overhang issues and priming liens 
will o�en be essential.60 One reason for optimism that bankruptcy courts will 
indeed show more willingness to grant priming liens if an increasing number 
of alternative-financing offers emerge from within debtors’ capital stack is that 
the presence of a concrete alternative offer reduces the risk of a disastrous out-
come if the court denies the favored lenders’ proposal. When debtors and their 
preferred lenders ask the court to approve a DIP financing proposal at the out-
set of the case, they o�en claim that the debtor is desperate for cash and will 
collapse if a proposed loan is not approved; in the absence of an alternative 
source of funds, bankruptcy judges are understandably reluctant to call their 
bluff.61 The threat is much less credible if an alternative lender has offered to 
provide funding. 
Of course, inside lenders are not all similarly situated. A distressed-debt in-
vestor that has recently acquired a portion of a senior or junior loan will have 
less of an information advantage than a single bank that has been a firm’s long-
time lender and provides all of the debtor’s banking services. This difference in 
status may be reflected in the terms of the loans the new insiders offer. A newly 
arrived distressed-debt investor may be more likely to seek to impose strict lim-
itations on the debtor’s options in bankruptcy, for instance, to minimize the 
 
59. Id. 
60. Other commentators also have emphasized the need for greater access to priming liens. See, 
e.g., Ayotte & Ellias, supra note 18, at 57-59 (advocating for blanket use of two-to-three 
month priming liens). 
61. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Pro-
cess in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 882-83 (2014) (describing the difficulty and 
rarity of challenging proposed bankruptcy sales supported by just enough DIP financing to 
fund the sale process). 
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risk of the loan.62 The new lender may also be more willing to provide exit fi-
nancing—that is, new financing for the debtor as it emerges from bankrupt-
cy—given that it will have the benefit of all the information produced by the 
bankruptcy case when it offers to make an exit loan (assuming the exit financ-
ing offer is made during or at the end of the case, rather than at the outset). 
To be sure, increased competitiveness in the DIP financing market would 
bring costs as well as benefits. If a debtor’s relational bank or other senior lend-
ers anticipate competition from other lenders if the debtor files for bankruptcy, 
this may affect their behavior prior to bankruptcy. For instance, they may be 
quicker to insist that the debtor put a chief restructuring officer in place to pro-
tect their interests. Lenders might also impose a higher interest rate to offset 
the loss of potential DIP financing profits. Although the prospect of bankrupt-
cy lending competition is probably not salient enough to affect loans to finan-
cially healthy debtors, it might impact struggling debtors. 
Despite these potential costs, genuine competition in the DIP financing 
market would almost certainly improve the efficiency of the bankruptcy pro-
cess. In addition to the burden of paying supracompetitive interest rates, the 
risk that favored lenders and a debtor’s managers will make deals that benefit 
one or both at the expense of the company and its other constituencies is quite 
high when the company falls into financial distress.63 A competitive financing 
market would help to address both concerns. A momentous unintended conse-
quence of the increased complexity of corporate debtors’ capital structure is 
that it makes financing market competition much more likely. 
iii .  impediments to competitive financing 
The story this Essay has told thus far is an optimistic one. Bankruptcy fi-
nancing was far more abundant during the pandemic than expected. Moreover, 
the shi� in debtors’ capital structure suggests that DIP financing will be more 
competitive a�er the pandemic than it was before, at least among firms with 
fragmented capital structures. 
The most obvious impediment to a more competitive lending market is 
courts’ reluctance to grant nonconsensual priming liens. Unlike the consensual 
 
62. Note that Mudrick’s proposed DIP financing for Neiman Marcus had this quality. It would 
have required that Neiman attempt to quickly sell its assets, likely to Saks Fi�h Avenue. See 
supra note 3 (describing the ninety-day timeline for an auction); Spector & DiNapoli, supra 
note 1 (describing Mudrick’s call for Neiman to consider a sale to Saks). But the preferred 
loan in Neiman also circumscribed the debtor’s options. 
63. Ayotte and Ellias consider, among other things, the possibility that current lenders may use 
their DIP loans to protect against fraudulent conveyance or preference challenges. Ayotte & 
Ellias, supra note 18, at 32-37. 
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priming liens a debtor’s existing lenders o�en give to themselves—with a new 
DIP loan priming their prebankruptcy loan—a nonconsensual loan requires a 
bankruptcy judge to determine at a valuation hearing that the earlier loan will 
be adequately protected. A thawing of this reluctance is essential to the emer-
gence of a competitive lending market, given the debt-overhang issues that dis-
courage new lenders from making loans without an assurance of priority. As 
discussed in the last Part, there are grounds for cautious optimism that this 
thawing could in fact occur.64 
But two additional impediments could interfere with the emergence of a 
more competitive DIP financing market. First, intercreditor agreements some-
times contain provisions that explicitly preclude potential lenders from making 
bankruptcy loans. Second, the restructuring support agreements that have be-
come a key feature of many Chapter 11 cases may indirectly achieve the same 
preclusive effect, by committing potential lenders to a reorganization strategy 
that incorporates the preferred lenders’ DIP loan. In this Part, I discuss these 
impediments and propose solutions for each. 
A. Explicit Restrictions on Financing 
When a corporate debtor borrows under a first- and second-lien financing 
arrangement, the first and second lienholders o�en use an intercreditor agree-
ment to allocate their rights vis-à-vis one another. One standard term gives first 
lienholders the exclusive right to enforce the parties’ rights in their collateral.65 
More aggressive restrictions may preclude the second liens from objecting to a 
reorganization plan supported by the first liens or may prohibit the second 
liens from providing DIP financing absent consent from the first lienholders.66 
 
64. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. The problem also could be addressed legislatively. 
To increase judges’ willingness to grant priming liens, for instance, the bankruptcy-
financing provision could be amended to require that the bankruptcy court hear preliminary 
evidence about the value of the company’s assets and the scope of the favored lender’s liens 
before rejecting an alternative-financing proposal that offers better terms than the favored 
loan. This would diminish the force of claims by the debtor that the court can avoid valua-
tion issues by simply approving the favored loan. 
65. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing this provision in the context of In re 
MPM Silicones, LLC (Momentive), 518 B.R. 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)). 
66. The American Bar Association’s Model First Lien/Second Lien Intercreditor Agreement in-
cludes a “compromise” provision, which prohibits the second lienholders from offering DIP 
financing secured by liens equal or superior to the first lienholders’ liens unless the first 
lienholders have not offered to provide DIP financing. Comm. on Com. Fin., Am. Bar Ass’n 
Section of Bus. L., Report of the Model First Lien/Second Lien Intercreditor Agreement Task 
Force, 65 BUS. L. 809, 857 (2010) (“No Second Lien Claimholder may provide DIP Financ-
ing to a Borrower or other Grantor secured by Liens equal or senior in priority to the Liens 
securing any First Lien Obligations[], provided that if no First Lien Claimholder offers to 
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The last of these provisions—the loan prohibition—is of concern here. It is 
not difficult to see why first lienholders might wish to have such a provision. 
Much as the second lienholders could undercut the first liens by objecting to a 
reorganization plan favored by the first liens, or by supporting a plan opposed 
by the first liens,67 providing financing also could interfere with the first 
lienholders’ objectives. A loan from the second liens could prolong the case at a 
time when the first lienholders want to force a sale or other quick resolution. 
If the second lienholders are trying to prolong the case and divert value 
from the first lienholders, a loan prohibition might be justifiable. But the risk 
that a DIP loan will be used to divert value does not seem great. Offering to 
make a DIP loan would be a cumbersome way to divert value, given that it re-
quires a substantial new investment from the second lienholders. To be sure, 
the investment would be compensated, but it is a substantial upfront expendi-
ture nonetheless. Moreover, it seems more likely that a loan prohibition will be 
used to divert value from other creditors to the first lienholders than it is that a 
loan from the second lienholders will divert value from the first liens. Of par-
ticular importance for present purposes, the uncertain benefits of the loan pro-
hibition come at the cost of cutting off one of the most promising potential 
sources—perhaps the most promising source—of alternative funding. 
Loan prohibitions can be analogized to two other provisions that limit a 
debtor’s options in Chapter 11: prebankruptcy stay waivers and ipso facto 
clauses. Stay waivers are usually negotiated by a debtor and its lender as part of 
an out-of-court workout of a loan; in return for the lender’s forbearance, the 
debtor agrees not to oppose a motion to li� the stay if the debtor subsequently 
files for bankruptcy.68 An ipso facto clause makes the debtor’s insolvency or 
bankruptcy an event of default under a contract.69 Courts are skeptical of stay 
waivers, but sometimes enforce them if other creditors have notice of their pro-
 
provide DIP Financing to the extent permitted under section 6.1(a) on or before the date of 
the hearing to approve DIP Financing, then a Second Lien Claimholder may seek to provide 
such DIP Financing secured by Liens equal or senior in priority to the Liens securing any 
First Lien Obligations, and First Lien Claimholders may object thereto[].”). 
67. A battle between the senior and junior liens in the Momentive case centered on the question 
whether the junior liens’ support for a plan opposed by the senior liens violated the parties’ 
intercreditor agreement. Judge Drain sided with the junior liens, concluding that the agree-
ment only gave the senior liens control over the collateral, and did not limit the junior liens’ 
right to take contrary positions on issues that did not directly implicate the collateral. In re 
MPM Silicones, 518 B.R. at 751-52. 
68. See Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 
82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 304 (1997); James T. Marcus & John F. Young, Enforcement of Pre-
Petition Waivers of the Automatic Stay, 26 COLO. LAW. 47, 47 (1997). 
69. See, e.g., Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Ineffi-
cient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 454-55 (1999) (criticizing the Bankruptcy Code’s 
invalidation of ipso facto clauses). 
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visions.70 Ipso facto clauses are invalidated by several provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.71 
Although the consequences of a loan prohibition are less severe than with a 
stay waiver, loan prohibitions actually are more problematic. The context 
where courts have tended to uphold prebankruptcy stay waivers is small busi-
nesses whose lender has a security interest in all of the debtor’s assets.72 A large 
majority of small businesses are not viable when they file for Chapter 11 and 
end up liquidating, with most or all of the value of the business going to the 
principal lender if there is one and little recovery for other creditors.73 Waiving 
the stay so that the lender is able to foreclose on the debtor’s assets therefore is 
not likely to impose externalities on other creditors, and courts generally do not 
enforce waivers if other creditors will be harmed.74 
Loan prohibitions are more similar to ipso facto clauses in this regard than 
to the stay waivers that courts generally enforce. An ipso facto clause may de-
prive the debtor of a contractual relationship or of the financing it needs to effi-
ciently resolve its financial distress. Loan prohibitions in intercreditor agree-
ments impede financing in similar fashion. Each undermines the purpose of 
Chapter 11, which is to provide a collective forum that enables the parties to 
preserve the going-concern value of a business if the business is viable when 
the debtor files for bankruptcy.75 A stay waiver that does not affect the interests 
of creditors other than the debtor’s principal lenders does not raise the same 
concerns. 
 
70. Tracht, supra note 68, at 311-13. 
71. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e), 541(c)(1)(B) (2018). 
72. See Tracht, supra note 68, at 312 (“Nearly all of the published cases on contractual waivers of 
specific bankruptcy rights address waivers of the automatic stay granted to a secured credi-
tor during a prepetition workout.”). See generally Mark A. Cody & Mark G. Douglas, A Brief 
Guide to Automatic Stay Waivers, Bankruptcy Remoteness, and Bad Boy Guarantees, JONES DAY 
(July/Aug. 2016), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2016/08/a-brief-guide-to-
automatic-stay-waivers-bankruptcy-remoteness-and-bad-boy-guarantees [https://perma.cc
/9JWS-HRXP] (providing background on automatic-stay waivers). 
73. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bank-
ruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2330-40 (2005) (demonstrating that typical Chapter 11 
debtors are small businesses whose businesses are not viable when they file for bankruptcy). 
74. See, e.g., Cody & Douglas, supra note 72 (noting “whether other parties are affected” as a fac-
tor that courts consider in determining whether to enforce a stay waiver). 
75. The classic exposition is THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
(1986). 
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The same point can be made another way: liquidity is essential to the reor-
ganization process;76 contractual provisions that interfere with a debtor’s abil-
ity to obtain new financing are thus inherently suspect. Given the conflict be-
tween loan prohibitions and the purpose of Chapter 11, a statutory prohibition 
is justified. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that a provision in current law that 
precludes debtors from invoking prebankruptcy commitments by a lender to 
extend credit should be repealed.77 Making both of these adjustments would 
have a salutary effect on access to financing in bankruptcy. 
Even in the absence of legislative reform, bankruptcy judges could address 
the problem by refusing to enforce loan prohibitions in most or all cases. 
Courts should override the provisions unless there is clear evidence the loan 
would be used to divert value from the first lienholders or other lenders that 
invoke the prohibition.78 
B. The Chilling Effect of Restructuring Support Agreements 
The second impediment to a competitive DIP financing market is more 
subtle and difficult to police. In many current bankruptcies, the parties enter 
into RSAs with key creditors before filing for bankruptcy.79 The RSA commits 
its signatories to support a reorganization plan consistent with the terms out-
lined in the RSA.80 RSAs provide a variety of important benefits, such as en-
hancing coordination among the debtor and its creditors by committing the 
signatories to requiring that anyone who buys a claim from them also honor 
the RSA. Absent an RSA, a deal that had been carefully negotiated might fall 
apart if enough of the signatories sold their claims to other investors.81 
Although o�en beneficial, RSAs sometimes have problematic features. 
They may be unjustifiably coercive, for instance, or give excessive fees to fa-
 
76. For a discussion of the importance of liquidity and features of bankruptcy law that increase 
access to liquidity, see Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 43; George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Poli-
cy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 66 (2000). 
77. Id. at 1608-09. 
78. This approach would, in a sense, be similar to courts’ treatment of stay waivers, though with 
a stronger presumption against enforcement. 
79. If the agreement is entered into during bankruptcy rather than before the filing, it is o�en 
called a plan support agreement (PSA) rather than an RSA. RSAs and PSAs are described in 
detail in David A. Skeel Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, 130 YALE L.J. 366, 378-81 
(2020). 
80. Id. at 370. 
81. Id. at 385 (discussing the significance of this risk given the extensive amount of claims trad-
ing in current cases). 
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vored parties.82 Another feature of many RSAs is of particular concern here. 
Like the loan prohibitions discussed in the last section, an RSA may preclude 
potential lenders from offering bankruptcy financing. At first glance, one might 
doubt that a potential lender would sign an RSA if the lender would lose the 
opportunity to make a profitable loan as a result. But RSAs o�en give signing 
fees to their signatories;83 the prospect of receiving a signing fee may therefore 
persuade the lender to forgo offering alternative financing. 
The favored insider financing in Neiman Marcus was linked to an RSA in 
precisely this way. As Neiman’s financial advisor put it in his declaration sup-
porting the financing request, the DIP financing agreement, the RSA, and a re-
lated agreement were “integrated and intertwined.”84 Lenders who wished to 
participate in the $675 million DIP financing were required to sign the RSA,85 
which dictated the path of the Chapter 11 case, committing the parties to a 
prompt recapitalization that would give control to the lender groups that pro-
vided the DIP financing. Signatories of the RSA would receive lucrative fees for 
agreeing to “backstop”—that is, to purchase any portion of a planned loan or 
issuance of stock that the debtor is unable to find investors for—the DIP fi-
nancing and $75 million in additional financing when Neiman exited Chapter 
11.86 
The RSA and DIP financing arrangement created two major impediments 
to alternative insider-financing offers. First, the preferred lenders minimized 
the risk of competition by locking up the vast majority of Neiman’s current 
 
82. These concerns are discussed in detail in id. at 395-405, which offers rules of thumb to courts 
for scrutinizing RSAs. 
83. Id. at 398-99. 
84. The other related agreement was an Exit Facility. Declaration of Tyler W. Cowan in Support 
of the Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing 
the Debtors to (A) Obtain Postpetition Financing and (B) Utilize Cash Collateral, (II) 
Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties, (III) Modifying the Automatic 
Stay, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (V) Granting Related Relief at 10, In re Neiman 
Marcus Grp., No. 20-32519 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 7, 2020) [hereina�er Cowan Declaration]. 
85. See, e.g., Superpriority Senior Secured Debtor-In-Possession Term Loan Credit Facility 
Backstop Commitment Letter 2 (May 7, 2020), in Neiman Marcus DIP Financing Motion, 
supra note 49, at 308, 309. 
86. “The Restructuring Support Agreement provides commitments from the Term Loan Lender 
Group . . . and the Noteholder Group to backstop the proposed $675 million new-money 
debtor in possession financing facility (the ‘DIP Facility’), provide a $750 million exit fi-
nancing facility (the ‘Exit Facility’), and support implementation of [the proposed] chapter 
11 plan . . . . Importantly, the DIP Lenders have agreed to provide the Prepetition Term Loan 
Lenders, the holders of the Second Lien Notes, the holders of the 2028 Debentures, and the 
holders of the Third Lien Notes with an opportunity to participate in the DIP Facility and 
Exit Facility if they sign the Restructuring Support Agreement.” Neiman Marcus DIP Fi-
nancing Motion, supra note 49, at 3-4. 
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lenders. Of the three principal lender groups, 78% of the first, 99% of the sec-
ond, and 70% of the third were signatories of the RSA and thus could not offer 
alternative financing.87 This significantly reduced the number of inside lenders 
that could plausibly bid against the preferred financing offer. 
Second, and related, an inside lender that wished to make an alternative-
financing offer would be forced to forgo the lucrative backstopping fees. The 
form of the fees implicitly precluded an inside lender from both signing the 
RSA and making an alternative-financing offer, since signatories to the RSA re-
ceived their compensation in the form of fees for backstopping the preferred 
financing. If the RSA offered cash fees to signatories, by contrast, it would be 
logically possible both to participate in the RSA and to offer alternative financ-
ing. But this distinction ultimately makes little difference: either way, the RSA 
had multiple terms that would be violated if a signatory sought to provide al-
ternative financing. RSA signatories were required to “support the Restructur-
ing Transactions,”88 and were not permitted to “object to, delay, impede, or take 
any other action to interfere with acceptance, implementation, or consumma-
tion of the Restructuring Transactions,” or to “propose, file, support, or vote 
for any Alternative Restructuring Proposal.”89 Lenders that signed the RSA 
thus gave up the right to offer alternative financing. 
Given these impediments to challenging the favored inside DIP financing 
proposal, it is quite surprising that a competing bid nevertheless emerged. 
Mudrick appears to have been excluded from the negotiations on the preferred 
financing.90 Neiman and the preferred lenders may have assumed that the large 
percentage of lenders included in the favored bid would discourage competi-
tors. 
In its response to the Mudrick offer, Neiman emphasized the fact that the 
Mudrick lenders held only a minority of the major existing debt—not enough 
to control a vote of the existing lenders whether to agree to a priming lien for 
Mudrick’s alternative financing—and that the proposal would therefore require 
a nonconsensual priming of the existing lenders. “[T]he Debtors received a 
 
87. Id. at 3. 
88. Declaration of Mark Weinstein, Chief Restructuring Officer of Neiman Marcus Group Ltd 
LLL, in Support of the Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders 
(I) Authorizing the Debtors to (A) Obtain Postpetition Financing and (B) Utilize Cash Col-
lateral, (II) Granting Adequate Protection to Prepetition Secured Parties, (III) Modifying 
the Automatic Stay, (IV) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (V) Granting Related Relief at 15 
app. B § 4.01(a)(i), In re Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 20-32519 (May 7, 2020) [hereina�er 
Neiman RSA]. 
89. Id. at 16. 
90. See Mudrick Objection, supra note 2, at 8-9 (describing Mudrick’s exclusion and efforts to 
participate). 
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competing proposal from a group of term loan lenders [i.e., the Mudrick 
group] that did not collectively hold greater than 50% of outstanding term 
loans, the requisite amount to achieve consent under the Term Loan Facility,” 
according to Neiman’s financial advisor.91 “As a result, the proposal would have 
required nonconsensual priming of existing term loan lenders with little to no 
remaining unencumbered collateral to offer to primed term loan lenders as ad-
equate protection.”92 
Neiman Marcus would have been a good opportunity for a court to grant a 
nonconsensual priming lien, or at the least to have given it more serious con-
sideration. The willingness of the existing lenders to provide $675 million of 
new financing secured by their existing liens suggests that Neiman’s assets 
were valuable enough to support significant new lending. Perhaps the Mudrick 
proposal was too flawed, but it was significantly cheaper. The court could have 
devoted a hearing specifically to the question of whether Neiman’s assets were 
sufficient to assure adequate protection of the existing lenders in the context of 
a priming lien. 
The Neiman experience also suggests that courts should scrutinize RSAs 
that are linked to DIP financing especially closely if they are likely to discourage 
competing loans from within the capital stack.93 Because it locked up substan-
tial majorities of the current lenders, the Neiman RSA was particularly suspect. 
In its objection, Mudrick stridently insisted that the backstop fees bore no rela-
tion to any value the backstoppers were providing, because there was little risk 
the backstop would be needed and the fee would be paid in steeply discounted 
stock.94 If this is correct, the court should have balked at the fees.95 Policing ex-
 
91. Cowan Declaration, supra note 84, at 11. 
92. Id. Neiman sounded the same themes in its motion for approval of the financing. See 
Neiman Marcus DIP Financing Motion, supra note 49, at 5 (“[T]he proposal required a pro-
tracted, costly, and difficult priming fight at the outset of these chapter 11 cases with little 
chance at success when the Debtors should be focused on stabilizing their operations and 
building further consensus . . . .”); id. at 32 (similar language); id. at 35-36 (similar lan-
guage). 
93. In a recent article on RSAs, I noted this issue but did not directly address it. Skeel, supra 
note 79, at 371 n.15. This Essay extends the analysis of that article. 
94. The backstop fees were paid in newly issued stock of the reorganized company at a 35% dis-
count to the expected value of the stock. Mudrick argued, “Where, as here, it is a virtual cer-
tainty that all who will receive rights are going to exercise them, there is no need for any 
backstop or payment of accompanying fees—much less the astronomical backstop fees that 
the Backstop Parties seek to extract from the estate here.” Mudrick Objection, supra note 2, at 
14 (footnote omitted). 
95. For an argument that rights offerings, which include similar backstopping fees, should be 
policed for reasonableness, see Shelby V. Saxon, Chapter 11 Rights Offerings and Private 
Placements: How Creditors Can Strike a Windfall, 94 AM. BANKR. L.J. 357 (2020). 
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cessive fees would diminish the pressure for lenders to join a favored deal and 
increase the likelihood of competition from other inside lenders. 
Another strategy for addressing the chilling effect of RSAs would be more 
intrusive, though it too would not require legislative change. Courts could for-
bid parties from using an RSA to prevent inside lenders from offering alterna-
tive financing, thus disentangling DIP financing from the RSA. This would be 
difficult to do if an RSA fee is directly linked to the DIP financing, as it was in 
Neiman. But if an RSA signatory wished to offer alternative financing, the 
court could require that the signatory be permitted to participate in the RSA 
(and fees linked to the RSA) if its financing offer did not prevail. In contexts 
where the RSA fee is not linked directly to DIP financing, a court could make 
clear that it would not enforce an RSA covenant that treats an alternative DIP 
financing offer as an event of default under the RSA. 
I have focused primarily on judicial correctives, in part due to the greater 
ease of implementation. Courts can intervene immediately, whereas legislation 
is much more uncertain, especially given that the flaws in the bankruptcy-
lending market may not seem sufficiently urgent to capture lawmakers’ atten-
tion. Attempting to remedy these frictions legislatively is also more likely to 
have unintended consequences than case-by-case intervention by courts. 
Despite the advantages of judicial oversight, the chilling effect of RSAs on 
competitive lending also could be addressed legislatively. Indeed, the prohibi-
tion on provisions that prevent potential lenders from offering bankruptcy fi-
nancing, as discussed earlier,96 could easily be made broad enough to invalidate 
RSAs to the extent that they prevent potential lenders from offering alternative 
financing. 
*    *    * 
Although the fragmented capital structure of many current debtors is 
grounds for optimism about the trajectory of the DIP financing market, espe-
cially if the impediments to competition in this market are addressed, it is im-
portant to acknowledge the limitations of the developments I have focused on. 
The increased competition among inside lenders that the Essay identifies and 
seeks to encourage will only occur with firms that have multiple lenders. Firms 
that fit the traditional paradigm of relying on a single bank lender for financ-
ing, as most smaller corporations still do, will not have the option of seeking 
funding from an alternative inside lender. These smaller firms already are 
much less likely to obtain DIP financing, and much less likely to reorganize, 
than large corporations.97 Under ordinary circumstances, these outcomes may 
 
96. See supra Section III.A. 
97. In a recent analysis, Peter Conti-Brown and I found that “73.49% of companies with over 
$200 million in assets and 61.94% of companies with assets of $100-200 million obtained 
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not be problematic, since few small firms appear to be viable when they file for 
bankruptcy. But in the event of a crisis that causes even viable firms to default, 
additional intervention may be needed to assure that these viable firms have ac-
cess to the funding they need in bankruptcy.98 
conclusion 
From a bankruptcy perspective, the pandemic had an unexpected silver lin-
ing: it revealed that a potential solution to the DIP financing market’s serious 
deficiencies is right in front of us. Rather than looking for ways to entice out-
side lenders to provide more competition for DIP financing, inside lenders may 
more effectively serve this role. A�er all, they suffer far less from the infor-
mation asymmetry that discourages outside lenders from competing with a fa-
vored inside lender. 
Although competing bidders are already emerging, as in the Neiman Mar-
cus case, they face significant obstacles, including courts’ reluctance to grant 
them nonconsensual priming liens and contractual provisions that forbid po-
tential lenders from offering an alternative source of financing. In addition to 
identifying these concerns, this Essay has considered how courts and Congress 
could remove them. Bankruptcy courts need to be more open to priming 
liens—and as more competing bids emerge, there is some hope they will be—
and they should invalidate RSA provisions that interfere with potential alterna-
tive-financing offers. Bankruptcy law should be amended to bar loan prohibi-
tions. Increasing competition in the bankruptcy-financing market would re-
duce the cost of credit for bankruptcy debtors, and it would remove one of the 
most glaring current impediments to an efficient reorganization process. 
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